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o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e
Energy Conservation and the Promotion of Legionella
pneumophila Growth: The Probable Role of Heat
Exchangers in a Nosocomial Outbreak
Emilie Bédard, PhD;1 Simon Lévesque, PhD;2 Philippe Martin, MD;3 Linda Pinsonneault, MD;4 Kiran Paranjape, MScA;5
Cindy Lalancette, PhD;2 Charles-Éric Dolcé, BEng;1 Manuela Villion, PhD;6 Louis Valiquette, MD;3
Sébastien P. Faucher, PhD;5 Michèle Prévost, PhD1
objective. To determine the source of a Legionella pneumophila serogroup 5 nosocomial outbreak and the role of the heat exchanger
installed on the hot water system within the previous year.
setting. A 400-bed tertiary care university hospital in Sherbrooke, Canada.
methods. Hot water samples were collected and cultured for L. pneumophila from 25 taps (baths and sinks) within wing A and 9 taps in wing
B. Biofilm (5) and 2 L water samples (3) were collected within the heat exchangers for L. pneumophila culture and detection of protists.
Sequence-based typing was performed on strain DNA extracts and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns were analyzed.
results. Following 2 cases of hospital-acquired legionellosis, the hot water system investigation revealed a large proportion of
L. pneumophila serogroup 5 positive taps (22/25 in wing A and 5/9 in wing B). High positivity was also detected in the heat exchanger of wing A
in water samples (3/3) and swabs from the heat exchanger (4/5). The outbreak genotyping investigation identified the hot water system as the
source of infections. Genotyping results revealed that all isolated environmental strains harbored the same related pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis pattern and sequence-based type.
conclusions. Two cases of hospital-acquired legionellosis occurred in the year following the installation of a heat exchanger to preheat
hospital hot water. No cases were reported previously, although the same L. pneumophila strain was isolated from the hot water system in 1995.
The heat exchanger promoted L. pneumophila growth and may have contributed to confirmed clinical cases.
Infect. Control Hosp. Epidemiol. 2016;37:1475–1480
Each year, hospital-acquired legionellosis cases result in
prolonged hospitalization with elevated mortality rates.1
These cases are predominantly associated with Legionella
pneumophila serogroup 1 (sg1) strains present in the hospital
hot water systems.2–4 A few outbreaks and isolated cases have
been related to L. pneumophila (Lp) serogroup 5 (sg5).5–7
Several factors can contribute to Legionella growth and
persistence within hospital water systems: temperature,
stagnation, biofilm, material, disinfectant, and water quality.8–12
Key measures to control Lp in hot water systems are to maintain
elevated water temperatures throughout the system and to
minimize stagnation through optimal water circulation.13–16
Although an infectious dose has not been determined, several
countries have established action levels between 1,000 and
10,000 colony-forming units (CFU)/L, and a concentration
higher than 10,000 CFU/L requires immediate corrective
actions.13,15,17–19
At the same time, healthcare facilities are encouraged to
implement energy and water conservation devices to meet
accreditation requirements, such as Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design certification. The use of waste heat
recovery systems to preheat hospital hot water prior to the
water heater is an option offered to hospitals to increase energy
efficiency. However, operational practices and ideal growth
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conditions associated with these devices can promote the
development and persistence of Lp unless a thorough risk
assessment is performed. In this study, we report a nosocomial
outbreak of Lp sg5 in the year following the installation of
2 heat exchangers in 2 distinct hospital wings as part of an
energy conservation upgrade. The objectives of our study were
to determine the source of the outbreak and to understand the
role of the heat recovery systems.
methods
Two nosocomial cases of Lp were reported in August 2014
within a wing (wing A) of a 400-bed tertiary care university
hospital in Sherbrooke, Canada. Clinical samples were
cultured on buffered charcoal-yeast extract (BCYE) medium,
and isolates were sent to the Laboratoire de Santé Publique du
Québec for identification and serogroup confirmation as
described previously.20 Following the reported cases, 250mL
of first flush hot water were collected from 25 taps (baths and
sinks) within wing A (300 beds) and from 9 taps within wing
B (100 beds, supplied by a separate hot water system). The heat
exchangers from wings A and B were investigated in June and
July 2015, respectively. Biofilm samples and water (2 L) were
collected from 3 locations: at the water inflow pipe, inside the
heat exchanger, and at the water outflow pipe. Two additional
biofilm samples were recovered within the heat exchanger.
Environmental samples were cultured according to the
Association Française de Normalisation NF T90-431 method21
with the addition of a 1-mL filtration. Briefly, different
volumes were filtered through sterile 47mm diameter 0.45 µm
mixed ester cellulose membranes (Millipore) and an untreated
sample volume of 0.2mL was plated on glycine-vancomycin-
polymyxin-cycloheximide selective agar (Biokar Diagnostics)
and incubated at 36°C for 10 days. Before plating, acid treat-
ment was applied to filtered samples (pH, 2; 5min). Typical
colonies that developed after 4 to 10 days were subcultured on
confirmation plates (BCYE agar without and with cysteine) for 2
to 4 days, at 36°C. Resulting colonies that developed on BCYE
agar, but not on BCYE without cysteine, were considered as
Legionella spp. The Legionella latex test (DR0800; Oxoid) was
used for Lp confirmation. The calculated detection limit for the
culture method was 10CFU/L for both Legionella spp. and Lp.
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and sequence-based
typing (SBT) were performed as described previously.20 In some
cases, nested-SBT protocol was performed on DNA extracts
obtained from water sampling.22 PFGE patterns were analyzed
according to the criteria of Tenover et al23 and with BioNumerics
software, version 6.5 (Applied Maths), by the unweighted pair-
group method with arithmetic average clustering method using
the Dice coefficient with both position tolerance and optimiza-
tion of 1%. Biofilm and water samples from the heat exchanger
were analyzed for the presence of protists through direct
microscopy and 18s polymerase chain reaction amplification
using the following primers: Euk1A (5′-CTGGTTGATCCTG
CCAG-3′); Euk516r (5′-ACCAGACTTGCCCTCC-3′).
Statistical analysis (Z-test and Kruskal-Wallis) was
performed with Statistica, version 10 (Dell), to compare the
percent positivity and level of Lp in wing A and wing B.
The significance level was set at P= .05.
results
Nosocomial legionellosis was diagnosed in 2 patients hospita-
lized in wing A (August 2014), and clinical specimens were
positive for Lp sg5. The first case occurred in the oncology
ward, on the seventh floor of wing A. The patient was admitted
on July 12 with acute myeloid leukemia. The first signs of
pneumonia appeared on August 1. A sample was collected
through bronchoalveolar lavage and the presence of Lp sg 2–14
was confirmed. The second case occurred in a patient admitted
on July 25 to the medical intensive care unit (ninth floor,
wing A) for a third-degree atrioventricular block. His main
comorbidity was a chronic obstructive pulmonary disease for
which he took prednisone. He had a permanent pacemaker
placement on July 26 and was transferred to the surgical ward
(eighth floor, wing A), where he stayed from July 27 to
August 5. Significant coronary artery disease was discovered
and he underwent coronary artery bypass graft surgery on
August 5. Following this intervention, he was transferred to the
surgical intensive care unit (third floor, wing B), where he
remained for the rest of his stay. The first signs of pneumonia
appeared on August 8 and clinical samples were recovered
through bronchoscopy. The presence of Lp sg 2–14 was also
confirmed. Provided the incubation time of 2 to 10 days, the
patient was possibly exposed during the 3-day stay in wing B
(intensive care unit) but most probably during the 10-day stay
in the surgical ward in wing A.
Environmental investigation from the hot water systems
revealed a large proportion of Lp sg5 positive taps with high
levels of contamination (88% in wing A and 56% in wing B;
Table 1), whereas there was no Lp detected in the cold water
feeding into the hospital.9 The percentage of positive taps and
the level of contamination by Lp were significantly higher in
wing A compared with wing B. A copper-silver ionization
treatment was present on both hot water systems at the time
of the outbreak. Disinfection by heat shock (≥60°C for
table 1. Legionella pneumophila Positivity and Levels Measured in
Hot Water Sampled From Taps in Wing A and Wing B at the Time of
the Outbreak (August 2014)
L. pneumophila positivity Wing A Wing B
Number of sampled taps 25 9
Number of L. pneumophila positive taps 22 5
Mean L. pneumophila, CFU/L 27,200 1,700
Standard deviation, CFU/L 18,921 1,857
Median L. pneumophila, CFU/L 18,000 1,000
Maximum L. pneumophila level, CFU/L 80,000 5,000
NOTE. CFU, colony-forming units.
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≥7 minutes at each tap) was conducted as previously descri-
bed9 in wing A (August 2014) and in wing B (September 2014).
The disinfection was followed by the implementation of a higher
temperature set point at the water heater outlet (≥60°C) in both
wings. Following temperature corrective measures, no cases of
legionellosis were reported despite written directives asking
hospital physicians to obtain Legionella cultures of respiratory
specimens for all cases of nosocomial pneumonia. No Lp were
detected in any of the water and biofilm heat exchanger samples
from wing B (including the feed and outflow water samples),
whereas high positivity for Lp sg5 was detected in wing A in
water samples (3/3) and swabs from the inner surface of the heat
exchanger (4/5). A gradient of Lp was observed in water samples
from wing A heat exchanger: 510CFU/L in the feed water,
5,000CFU/L in the heat exchanger water, and 88,000CFU/L in
the outflow water, prior to the water heater. Protists were not
readily observed by microscopy in any of the collected samples.
Polymerase chain reaction also failed to detect protists in the
biofilm swabs and in water samples. The heat exchangers were
stopped at the time of the sampling and have not been back in
service since.9
The hospital hot water was preheated with residual energy
from the building heating system loop with single-pass heat
exchangers (34 plates in wing A and 21 plates in wing B). The
available surfaces were estimated at 15m2 (wing A) and 5.5m2
(wing B), with water volumes of 11.4 L and 3.8 L, respectively,
resulting in a very high surface-to-volume ratio of 14 cm− 1.
Temperatures within the heat exchangers ranged from 9°C to
46°C, and prolonged stagnation was observed during the night,
resulting in no flow for 48% and 51% of the time in wing A
and wing B, respectively. The average flow rates during daily
operation were estimated to be 18 L/min in wing A and
43.8 L/min in wing B, well below the maximum designed flow
rate of 230L/min. Figure 1 illustrates the flow diagram of the heat
exchangers for both wings. The hot water temperature feeding
into both distribution systems was less than 55°C before the
outbreak.
In total, 34 clinical and environmental isolates (wing A),
7 environmental isolates (wing B), and 4 environmental
isolates collected in 1995 (wing A) were typed by PFGE and
SBT (Figure 2). Environmental isolates dating from 1995 were
collected from the hot water system in wing A as part of a
previous case investigation, where the source of infection was
found to be unrelated to this hospital. Genotyping results
revealed that all isolated environmental strains (1995 and
2014) harbored the same related PFGE pattern as the outbreak
strain (Figure 2). All typed isolates were also from the same
SBT type (ST-1427). Partial SBT profiles were obtained from
12 additional hot water sample DNA extracts using the nested-
SBT protocol (Table 2), collected a year after the outbreak.9
The obtained alleles were similar to ST-1427 for 11 of the
12 DNA extracts, suggesting the presence of the same strain in
those water samples.
discussion
The environmental investigation indicated the hot water
system as the most probable source of the outbreak. Although
Lp was detected in both systems investigated, the level of
contamination was significantly higher in wing A. Despite the
observed reduction in hot water contamination levels after the
heat shock disinfection,9 Lp was still detected by culture in
figure 1. Hot water production unit flow diagram for wing A (A) and wing B (B). Differences between the 2 systems are highlighted in a
different color; the letter X indicates sampling locations before and after the heat exchangers.
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more than 45% of faucets and in the recirculation water
for both wings in February 2015, 6 months after the imple-
mentation of corrective measures. The high level of Lp
outbreak strain detected in all water samples from the heat
exchanger in wing A at the time of sampling suggests its
potential colonization and role at the time of the outbreak.
Although no protists could be isolated, their presence in heat
exchangers should also be monitored in light of the manu-
facturer’s warning of biofouling risk due to organisms such as
protozoa, a natural reservoir for Lp.24
The relatedness of the environmental strains (n= 4 in 1995;
n= 39 in 2014–2015) and patient strains (n= 2) confirms a
system-wide contamination with the established Lp sg5 strain
and suggests its persistence over a period of 20 years in the hot
water system. The heat exchanger in wing A promoted the Lp sg5
genotype present in the system, whereas no colonization of the
wing B heat exchanger was identified. Detailed investigation of
the flow diagrams and onsite validation showed important dif-
ferences between the design and operation of the 2 hot water
systems, including the heat exchanger configuration (Fig. 1). The
heat exchanger from wing A was fed by a combination of cold
makeup water and recirculated hot water depending on demand,
and up to 48% of the recirculated water did not transit through
the flash water heater. The risk of Lp proliferation in heat
exchangers is exacerbated by (1) the prevailing environmental
conditions (eg, temperature, surface area, surface-to-volume
ratio, materials); (2) operational conditions (eg, low flow, stag-
nation); and (3) themicrobial load and presence of Lp in the feed
figure 2. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) patterns and sequence-based typing (SBT) types of Legionella pneumophila serogroup 5
isolated from clinical and environmental samples.
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water, which was the case in wing A for the recirculated water
feed. The presence of the outbreak strain in the system for the
past years combined with feeding contaminated recirculated
water into a heat exchanger providing ideal growth conditions
likely culminated in the higher Lp loads measured in wing A and
a higher risk of infection. The contamination observed in wing B
was associated with areas having recirculation deficiencies, pre-
venting the hot water temperature from being maintained in
these areas. Resolution of the identified deficiencies contributed
to the reduction in Lp contamination observed.9
The physical characteristics and operating conditions of
heat exchangers provide ideal conditions for biofilm formation
and the development of opportunistic pathogens. In the
present study, although physical characteristics of the heat
exchangers were similar in the 2 wings, the piping diagram and
operating conditions were different. Design and operation of
hot water system should prevent Lp proliferation and prevent
the conditions in which amoebae-hosting biofilms develop.
Furthermore, hot water system operators should not rely on
the passage of water through the water heater to inactivate
Lp from the recirculating stream and makeup preheated water.
Short exposure to elevated temperatures may not be sufficient
to inactivate certain strains of Lp shown to resist high
temperatures (70°C) for prolonged periods (60 minutes) and
to develop heat resistance after shock treatment.25,26
Our study was subjected to a number of limitations. First,
although the same strain was isolated in the system in 1995,
we could only hypothesize that it was present continuously in
the system over the 20 years preceding the outbreak in 2014
since there was no monitoring of Lp performed in the hot
water system during those years. Second, PFGE could not be
performed on strains isolated from the hot water system
samples 1 year after the outbreak. Third, owing to the urgency
to apply corrective measures, the observed decrease in system
contamination cannot be attributed to a specific corrective
measure but rather to the sum of actions that were taken to
eradicate the contamination. Finally, sampling of the heat
exchangers was not performed at the time of the outbreak
because they were not suspected initially.
In healthcare facilities serving patients more vulnerable to
legionellosis, the risk associated with the installation of such
devices needs to be carefully evaluated with respect to the
important costs associated with legionellosis hospitalization
(US $34,000/episode) and the elevated mortality rate.1
Estimated energy savings in the present case study ranged from
US $700 to US $1,700 per month. The addition of energy
conservation devices and operational procedures should be
evaluated by the water safety committee together with the infec-
tion prevention and control team, and weighed against the risk of
exposing patients and the burden of preventive monitoring.
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